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INTRODUCTION
Twice in the course of history the idea of human rights arose as a wave, exerting a powerful influence in the fields of politics, legislation and the administration of justice. The first wave had its beginnings in the seventeenth century and its culmination towards the end of the eighteenth century. The second wave began its rise in the present century and has, I am sure, not yet reached its culmination. But what was the origin of this revival of the human rights idea? When did it come about and how?
Many historical accounts treat this question in a way that cannot satisfy me. Having dealt with the famous declarations of the late eighteenth century, they make a big jump to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 where the promotion of human rights was included among the purposes of the United Nations. This inclusion is then explained as a reaction to the atrocities committed during the Second World War. I do not doubt that there is a link between the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during the war and the emphasis placed on human rights in the San Francisco Charter, but this can only be a partial explanation. Human rights already had been recognized as a matter of international concern in important policy statements when the most sinister part of these horrors-the holocaust-was yet to come.
On 6 rations which Albania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania had to make as a condition for their admission to the League of Nations. Moreover, similar clauses were included in two bilateral treaties, namely between Germany and Poland regarding Upper Silesia and between Germany and Lithuania regarding the Memel Territory. All these instruments assigned certain supervisory powers to the Council of the League of Nations.
It is important to note that the special regime created by these "minority clauses" included guarantees that were not limited to the members of minorities as such. In fact, the regime consisted of three categories of obligations. Firstly, it guaranteed full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the country or region concerned, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. Secondly, it guaranteed that all nationals would be equal before the law and would enjoy the same civil and political rights, without distinction as to race, language or religion. Thirdly, it provided for a series of special guarantees for nationals belonging to minorities, for instance concerning the use of their language and the right to establish social and religious institutions.
Although the minority clauses only covered a handful of countries, they were of historical significance as unprecedented limitations on national sovereignty under international law. The states upon which these clauses had been imposed protested time and again that they were discriminated against since no other states had to observe similar international obligations. post of "perpetual secretary-general," organized conferences and various other activities; it also published a voluminous Dictionnaire Diplomatique which appeared in an irregular series of editions from 1933 to 1973.8 One of the first actions of the Academy was to set up a commission to study the question of the protection of human rights. Both Frangulis and Mandelstam were members of this commission. On the basis of a memorandum submitted by the latter, the commission drew up a resolution that was adopted by the Academy on 28 November 1928. This resolution took as its starting point the first and the second category of the obligations laid down in the minority clauses of 1919 and 1920. It stated that it was highly desirable to generalize the protection of the rights covered by these obligations, namely the right of all inhabitants of a state to full and complete protection of life and liberty, and the right of all nationals of a state to equality before the law and to enjoyment of the same civil and political rights, without distinction as to race, language or religion. The resolution concluded by expressing the wish that a worldwide convention would be brought about under the auspices of the League of Nations ensuring the protection and the respect of these rights. The Bernheim case exposed of course the absurdity of the limited regime for the protection of minorities created after the World War. In the course of the Council deliberations several speakers touched upon the greater principles involved. However, matters of principle were raised in a more explicit way in the Assembly of the League of Nations during its regular annual session. This session, which lasted from 25 September to 11 October 1933, was overshadowed by the recent developments in Germany.
At the start of the session some sensation was caused by the sudden arrival of the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, who had himself inscribed as a delegation member in the plenary and in the sixth committee (the political committee).22 However, Goebbels only paid a short visit to the Mr. Frangulis defended the Haitian proposal, arguing that the solution should not be sought in generalization of the rights of minorities but in generalization of the human rights pertaining to all people, whether belonging to a minority or to a majority. In the public debate hardly any delegate referred explicitly to Frangulis' remarks. However, the Greek and the Irish delegate did advocate the conclusion of a universal convention for the safeguarding of human rights. The Greek delegate referred in particular to the Declaration of the International Law Institute. The Czechoslovak delegate, Minister Beneg, agreed that respect for the human being as such was the only true basis for solving the problem of the minorities.
After this first round of discussion all proposals were referred to a subcommittee meeting behind closed doors. There the delegates of Haiti and Poland were persuaded to withdraw their proposals in favor of the French proposal. The Polish draft had no sufficient support because many governments continued to dislike the idea of a general convention for the protection of minorities, fearing that it would provoke minority problems where they didn't yet exist and that it would stimulate separatist tendencies. As to the objections raised against Frangulis' proposal, some had to do with its implications for the situation in the colonies. It was also argued that acceptance of the proposal would alienate the United States (obviously in view of the position of the black population). Moreover, there were apprehensions that the Haitian proposal would lead to a fateful confrontation with the German government. At that time the other major powers were still bent on keeping Germany in the League of Nations, in particular as they still hoped to achieve agreement with the Germans in the Disarmament Conference. Anyway, a majority in the subcommittee seems to have believed that, in the existing circumstances, the French proposal offered the best prospect for strengthening the position of the Jews in Germany.25 However, when the sixth committee dealt with the sub-committee's report, the German delegation said it regarded the second part of the French proposal as directed against Germany and voted against it. All other votes were in favor. Accordingly, the proposal was adopted by the sixth committee since the notorious unanimity rule of the League of Nations only applied to voting in plenary meetings of the Assembly and the Council.
On 11 October, the last day of the session, the plenary Assembly adopted unanimously the first part of the French draft resolution; the second part was not put to the vote because the German delegation announced it would vote against it. Even this meager result was welcomed by some as important progress, since Germany had now formally endorsed the Assembly resolution which had been adopted in 1922 without its participation because at that time it was not yet a member of the League.
However The Declaration now opened with a very long preamble, followed by ten clauses which were not ordered in exactly the same sequence as in Wells' initial draft. These clauses dealt interalia with the rights to nourishment and medical care, the rights to education and to access to information, the freedom of discussion, association and worship, the right to work, the free- That a man unless he is declared by a competent authority to be a danger to himself or to others through mental abnormality, a declaration which must be annually confirmed, shall not be imprisoned for a longer period than six days without being charged with a definite offence against the law, nor for more than three months without a public trial. At the end of the latter period, if he has not been tried and sentenced by due process of law, he shall be released. Nor shall he be conscripted for military or any other service to which he has conscientious objection. . . . That no man shall be subjected to any sort of mutilation or sterilisation except with his own deliberate consent, ... nor to torture, beating or any other bodily punishment; he shall not be subjected to imprisonment with such an excess of silence, noise, light or darkness as to cause mental suffering. Wells' books and articles were widely circulated in America. Moreover, from September to November 1940 Wells promoted the Declaration during a transcontinental lecture tour in the United States. At that time the discussion of the issue in Britain had lost its momentum. It had typically been a matter of public interest during the "phony war." After Germany had opened its offensive on the Western front in May 1940, the British people had more urgent priorities than theorizing about an ideal world order. On the other hand, the United States was not directly involved in the war until December 1941. There, thinking about the post-war world order engaged many minds as will be illustrated in section VIII.
VII. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS
When President Franklin Roosevelt addressed the US Congress on 6 January 1941 about the "State of the Union," he concluded his address with his famous peroration on the Four Freedoms.47 This formula was entirely of his own making. When the State of the Union Message was being drafted and had already gone through three versions, Roosevelt surprised his collaborators by dictating an addition which he opened with the sentence: "In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms," after which he set out the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear.48
Although the 1941 State of the Union address was the first occasion at which Roosevelt presented his formula to the public, he had spoken before in private of this concept. In a meeting with church leaders in January 1940 he had already advanced the idea of formulating some fundamental principles for a new world order.49 I know no report of that meeting, but there is a transcript of a talk with journalists on 5 July 1940 which makes clear that he had then already set out his idea many times.50 As regards other amendments tabled before the deadline of 4 May, I may mention a South African proposal for a preamble including the words "to reestablish faith in fundamental human rights" (which was adopted) and a proposal of New Zealand to include in the Charter an obligation of all members "to preserve, protect and promote human rights" (which was not adopted).
Taking into account the amendments that had been tabled by 4 May 1945, the agreed position of the Latin American delegations and the positive attitude towards the human rights issue with which several other delegations entered the San Francisco Conference, I now realize that in this matter the founders of the United Nations were not "prompted by the horrors that came to light after the collapse of the Third Reich." Besides, even at the day the Charter was signed the delegates in San Francisco did not yet grasp the full scale of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis. It has taken many years before the real dimensions of the holocaust became widely known. I may add that most delegates in San Francisco had also no notion of the dimensions of the horrors committed under Stalin.
X. EPILOGUE-THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
My limited investigation into the comeback of the human rights idea yielded a considerable amount of information that was completely new-not only to me but also to several of my friends who have worked many years in the field of human rights. How is it possible that the human rights movement of today is unaware of the credit it owes to the efforts of A.N. Mandelstam and the campaign of H.G. Wells? Why had we never learned that a formal proposal has been submitted to the League of Nations for the elaboration of an international convention to protect human rights?
The findings which I set out in the present article have not diminished my curiosity about the origins of the human rights revival. On the contrary, they have intensified my wish to see a substantial book written on this subject. There is so much more to be explored, for example concerning the influence exerted by the different groups who worked for an international status of human rights, and concerning the thoughts they developed on such questions as codification, supervision, sanctions and intervention. I would hope that one or more historians sufficiently familiar with the human rights issue would set themselves the task of examining the records of as many as possible of the institutions and organizations that have played a role in this matter in the 1920s, the 1930s and the early 1940s. I hope they could still speak with some of the people who once participated in the movement meant by Brunet.
If a book would be written on the human rights revival of the first half of this century, I am convinced it will tell a fascinating story and find many interested readers.
The Hague, 23 March 1992
